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INAPPROPRIATE FORUM OR INAPPROPRIATE LAW?
A CHOICE-OF-LAW SOLUTION TO THE JURISDICTIONAL
STANDOFF BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN
AMERICA
ABSTRACT
Numerous substantive and procedural advantages make the U.S. court
system a uniquely attractive forum to plaintiffs worldwide. As a result, U.S.
courts increasingly rely on forum non conveniens (FNC), a common law
doctrine permitting a court to dismiss a case to another more convenient forum
that is also available for the litigation. When the foreign plaintiffs hail from
Latin America, however, their home forums are often unavailable following an
FNC dismissal due to the Latin American courts’ interpretation of their own
preemptive system of jurisdiction. To make this clear and prevent U.S. courts
from dismissing for FNC, numerous Latin American countries recently have
enacted “blocking statutes,” explicating that a Latin American court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a case dismissed abroad under the FNC doctrine.
Many U.S. courts refuse to accept the outcome this legislation seems to dictate
and, through incorrect FNC analysis, continue to dismiss these cases to Latin
America, where they will not be heard.
This Comment argues that the refusal of U.S. courts to accept jurisdiction
over these cases reflects their discomfort with the reinterpretation of
traditional civil law concepts embodied in the Latin American legislation, with
outcome-determinative results. Since numerous commentators have failed to
recognize this, instead characterizing the blocking statutes as mere
reiterations of longstanding civil law principles, no proposed solution has
adequately accommodated the courts’ concerns alongside those of the
plaintiffs. An ideal strategy will both effectively manage a court’s forum
shopping concerns and ensure a plaintiff his day in court. Thus, rather than
unreservedly accept jurisdiction over cases better heard elsewhere, or
manipulate the FNC doctrine to exclude these cases and deny plaintiffs any
relief, the solution should target the source of the problem: advantageous tort
law in the United States, which draws plaintiffs to file cases here that are only
tangentially related to the forum. For this reason, choice-of-law legislation is
the best course of action. Mandatory application of foreign law to these
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disputes effectively dissuades foreign plaintiffs from forum shopping in the
United States without denying them a forum in which to litigate.
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INTRODUCTION
And so the plaintiffs . . . argue that the United States has a greater
interest in the litigation than Argentina because the defendants are
American companies, while the defendants argue that Argentina has
a greater interest than the United States because the plaintiffs are
Argentines. The reality is that neither country appears to have any
interest in having the litigation tried in its courts . . . .
1
—Judge Richard Posner

In our global economy, routine business endeavors affect a variety of
people and places, as does the fallout when something goes wrong. Inevitably,
the question of which court will address the ensuing litigation is increasingly
difficult as the numbers of affected persons and forums grow. Each party has
an interest in litigating in a particular court; each court has a particular interest
in adjudicating—or not adjudicating, as the case may be. Recent international
developments in the context of disputes between Latin American plaintiffs and
U.S. defendants have further complicated this determination. The following
case is illustrative.
In Chandler v. Multidata Systems International Corp.,2 the Panamanian
plaintiffs3 included twenty-eight cancer patients overexposed to radiation
during therapy at an oncology institute in Panama City, Panama.4 On October
17, 2001, they filed suit in St. Louis County, Missouri,5 one corporatedefendant’s domicile.6 Alleging that the defendants’ computer-operated
treatment system erroneously calculated the dosages required for treatment, the
injured parties (or representatives of the decedents) sought damages based on
wrongful death and negligence.7

1 Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 2009). The Argentine plaintiffs in Abad were more
than six hundred hemophiliacs infected with the AIDS virus from a clotting factor manufactured by the
defendant-corporation in the United States. Id. at 668–69. The court subsequently dismissed the plaintiffs’
claims to Argentina, id. at 672–73, a civil law country that may refuse jurisdiction based on its interpretation of
its own law. Id. at 666.
2 163 S.W.3d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
3 Two plaintiffs were actually U.S. citizens living in Panama, and two were U.S. residents. However,
the court did not treat this distinction as relevant. Id. at 541 n.1.
4 Id. at 541.
5 Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2008).
6 Chandler, 163 S.W.3d at 541. The defendant was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in St. Louis County, Missouri. Id.
7 Id. at 541–42.
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The defendants immediately moved to dismiss for forum non conveniens
(FNC),8 arguing that Panama was available as a more convenient forum in
which to litigate the dispute.9 In response, the plaintiffs contested Panama’s
availability; since they had properly filed first in the United States, the
Panamanian court would not hear a dispute if dismissed for FNC.10 Thus, FNC
dismissal was improper.11 Each side presented expert testimony in support of
its position.12
With the above case still pending, one plaintiff filed a petition in the San
Miguelito Judicial District Court of Panama against the defendants.13 The
court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction:
Since the Panamanian Judicial Code follows the doctrine of “preemptive jurisdiction,” once the [plaintiff] chose to file the complaint
in the domicile of one of the defendants . . . , this Court of Justice and
the Panamanian Court cannot and will never have jurisdiction over
14
the defendants or over the subject matter of this case.

The plaintiffs presented this language to the Missouri court as further proof
that Panama was unavailable for subsequent litigation.15 Rejecting this
argument,16 the court granted the defendants’ FNC motion, but explicitly
permitted the plaintiffs to refile in Missouri should Panama refuse

8 Forum non conveniens, a common law doctrine, permits a court to decline jurisdiction over a case
when another forum is substantially more convenient for the proceedings. See infra Part.I.A.
9 Chandler, 163 S.W.3d at 542. In particular, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs lived and were
injured in Panama, and most of the evidence and witnesses were there. Johnston, 523 F.3d at 606.
10 Chandler, 163 S.W.3d at 544.
11 In a majority of courts, an FNC dismissal depends on finding that another forum exists for litigation of
the dispute. See infra Part I.B.
12 See Chandler, 163 S.W.3d at 542–45.
13 Josefina Escalante v. Multidata Sys. Int’l, Corp., Court Order No. 1922-03 (Pan. 1st Ct. J. Civ. Cir.
Apr. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Josefina Escalante], excerpt available at http://www.iaba.org/LLinks_forum
_non_Panama.htm.
14 Id.
The Panamanian appellate court affirmed this decision; the Supreme Court of Panama
subsequently denied the defendant’s appeal for annulment. Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens in
Panama, INTER-AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.iaba.org/LLinks_forum_non_Panama.htm (last visited May 30,
2011). Because the U.S. case was ongoing at this time, the Panamanian court may have rested its decision on
lites pendencia (lis alibi pendens), a civil law doctrine that precludes a plaintiff from suing a party against
whom another suit is pending for the same incident. See PETER HAY, RUSSELL WEINTRAUB & PATRICK J.
BORCHERS, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 207 (13th ed. 2009); see also infra note 119.
However, the decision’s overly broad language suggests that the court would have reached the same outcome
had the U.S. case already been dismissed. See Josefina Escalante, supra note 13.
15 Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 2008).
16 Presumably, the court instead accepted the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs intentionally filed
the case in the wrong Panamanian venue (i.e., not the venue where the injuries occurred). See id.
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jurisdiction.17 In order to refile, the court noted, a Panamanian court of
competent jurisdiction and venue must deny jurisdiction, even after learning of
the defendants’ willingness to submit.18 On appeal, the Missouri Court of
Appeals affirmed: the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Panama
available because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any sections in Panama’s
Judicial or Civil Code prohibiting their refiling in Latin America.19
Finally, on May 26, 2006, four of the plaintiffs refiled their claims in the
Judicial District Court for Panama City, Panama.20 Relying on Article 238 of
the Panamanian Judicial Code, the same plaintiffs then argued that the first
court to hear a case “preempts and precludes the jurisdiction of the other
courts,” and so the Panamanian court lacked jurisdiction.21 The defendants
insisted that this doctrine of preemptive jurisdiction applies only to domestic
cases; the plaintiffs argued for its international application.22 The district court
agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that “preemptive jurisdiction dissolves
Panamanian jurisdiction when the lawsuit is filed first in another country that
has jurisdiction according to its own legal system.”23 In March 2009, the First
Superior Court for the First Judicial District of Panama affirmed this ruling.24

17 Id. at 606–07 (citing Chandler v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., No. 01CC-3634, slip op. at 2 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
Jan. 8, 2004)).
18 Id.
19 Chandler v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 163 S.W.3d 537, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). In its analysis, the
court refused to consider the appellate decision rendered in Panama, see supra note 14, because that decision
was not before the lower court. Still, the court construed its applicable parts as dicta based on the Panamanian
court’s finding that plaintiffs had filed in the wrong venue. Chandler, 163 S.W.3d at 548. Rather than appeal
this dismissal to the Missouri Supreme Court, the plaintiffs immediately filed four new cases before the
original U.S. circuit court. They argued that the Panama Court of Appeals’ subsequent affirmation of its lower
court’s dismissal, see supra note 14, satisfied the conditions imposed by the Missouri Court of Appeals for
refiling. The court rejected this argument, reiterated the requirements outlined by the Missouri Court of
Appeals, and dismissed again without prejudice. Johnston, 523 F.3d at 607.
20 Johnston, 523 F.3d at 607 n.1. Prior to this filing, the plaintiffs also filed in federal court in Texas,
which ultimately dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id.
21 Gilles Cuniberti, Preemptive Jurisdiction Trumps Forum Non Conveniens in Panama,
CONFLICT OF LAWS .NET (Mar. 19, 2009), http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/preemptive-jurisdiction-trumpsforum-non-conveniens-in-panama (internal quotation mark omitted). At this point, the name of the case was
Tobal v. Multidata Systems International Corp. Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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Most recently, on August 3, 2010, the Panamanian Supreme Court of
Justice upheld these lower court decisions.25 While Article 259 of the Code of
Civil Procedure grants Panamanian jurisdiction when the injuries occur in
Panama, “the instant case should be viewed under the special rules of Private
International Law” due to its numerous puntos de conexión, or international
elements.26 The Court instead turned to Article 1421-J of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a “special rule[] for the resolution of international disputes.”27
Article 1421-J provides in full:
In cases referred to in this chapter, national judges lack jurisdiction if
the claim or the action filed in the country has been previously
rejected or dismissed by a foreign judge applying forum non
conveniens. In these cases, national judges must reject hearing the
lawsuit or the action due to reasons of a constitutional or preventive
28
jurisdiction nature.

Accordingly, as held by the Panamanian Supreme Court, the Panamanian
courts were barred from hearing the dispute based on the doctrine of
preemptive jurisdiction.29
Over the course of this litigation, both the United States and Panama have
independently assessed the defendants’ fault in other contexts;30 yet both
countries have repeatedly refused to oversee the injured parties’ claims. To
this end, the U.S. courts employed forum non conveniens, a common law
doctrine permitting a court to decline jurisdiction over a case when another
more convenient forum exists.31 A historical “gatekeeper” to the significant
procedural and substantive advantages offered by the American legal system,32
25 Gilles Cuniberti, Panamanian Conflict Rules Trump Forum Non Conveniens, CONFLICT OF LAWS .NET
(Aug. 16, 2010), http://conflictoflaws.net/2010/panamanian-conflict-rules-trump-forum-non-conveniens/
(analyzing and reprinting sections of the August 3rd decision of the Panamanian Supreme Court of Justice).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. (emphasis omitted).
29 Id.
30 The Panamanian government requested two independent investigations, each concluding that the
defendant’s equipment malfunctioned. Based on these findings, numerous practitioners lost their licenses; two
were criminally convicted of negligent homicide. Chandler v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 163 S.W.3d 537,
541–42 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). In the United States, the FDA enjoined Multidata from manufacturing and
distributing medical devices. Press Release, M2 Presswire, FDA Seeks Injunction Against Multidata Systems
Intl. (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-101438142.html.
31 See infra Part I.
32 See infra Part I.C. As FNC dismissals most commonly occur against foreign plaintiffs bringing tort
claims against U.S. defendants for injuries suffered in the plaintiffs’ home country, this scenario is assumed
throughout this Comment.
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this doctrine thus ensures that U.S. courts do not become havens for the
“afflicted of the world.”33 Courts especially rely on FNC in the international
context, to prevent foreign plaintiffs injured abroad from taking advantage of
plaintiff-friendly U.S. tort laws, often applied to these disputes.34
Yet FNC requires that another forum is available to hear the case; most
often, this forum is the plaintiff’s home country, which the U.S. court has
concluded will accept jurisdiction following its dismissal.35 However, unlike
common law countries, civil law regimes recognize a preemptive system of
jurisdiction, according absolute deference to a plaintiff’s choice of forum.36
Perceiving FNC dismissals to compromise their jurisdictional system, many
Latin American countries have recently held that they cannot accept
jurisdiction over cases dismissed abroad for this reason.37 Some courts base
this determination on their national codes of civil procedure; others rely on
more recent legislation, or “blocking statutes,” enacted specifically to ensure
this outcome.38 The refusal of either country to accept the other’s approach, as
demonstrated above, creates “boomerang litigation” that ultimately leaves the
plaintiff without any recourse.
This Comment addresses the conflict presented by FNC dismissals to Latin
America,39 so long as both the doctrine of FNC and blocking statutes persist.
Thus, rather than decide the merits of FNC in general,40 this Comment seeks to
33

Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT’L L.J. 321,
352 (1994).
34 See infra Part I.C.
35 See infra Part I.A–B.
36 See infra Part II.
37 See infra Part II.
38 This distinction and its implications are further discussed in Part II below. However, this Comment
otherwise treats these distinct modes of reasoning synonymously because they reach the same end. For this
reason, when this Comment discusses the effects of blocking statutes, it intends that discussion to refer also to
“judicial retaliation,” wherein Latin American courts interpret their national codes of procedure to accomplish
the same results as achieved by the blocking statutes.
39 It is important to note that U.S. courts do not actually dismiss for FNC to any other country or its
courts. See infra Part III.B.1. Rather, the language “FNC dismissal to” is intended as convenient shorthand
for an FNC dismissal that a U.S. court expects will result in the plaintiff’s refiling in a certain country (i.e., the
country that the court has already identified as “available” for the litigation). Having made this concession,
this characterization is fair because a U.S. court must necessarily identify another forum for the litigation in
order to grant an FNC dismissal. See infra Part I.B.1.
40 This discussion has many contributors representing a range of perspectives.
Compare, e.g.,
Weintraub, supra note 33, at 352 (concluding that the elimination of FNC would make the United States “a
magnet forum” and “place our companies at a world-wide competitive disadvantage”), with Winston
Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Constitutional Right of Access: A Commonwealth Caribbean
Perspective, 2 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 51 (1993) (arguing that the doctrine of FNC raises a serious
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reconcile the perceived needs of U.S. courts, reflected in their routine reliance
on this doctrine,41 with the jurisdictional reality in Latin America.42 Part I
presents the “competing” jurisdictional doctrines. This Part first introduces the
common law doctrine of FNC, paying particular attention to the policy
implications of the modern formulation, before exploring the principles of civil
law preemptive jurisdiction, including the recent blocking statutes purporting
to codify these principles.
Part II then discusses U.S. courts’ treatment of FNC motions to Latin
America in view of these blocking statutes, both in practice and ideally. In
particular, Part II argues that these statutes reinterpret traditional civil law
concepts, significantly affecting a U.S. court’s ability to dismiss for FNC.
Failing to give this proper attention, numerous commentators have
inadequately explained the responses of U.S. courts. As a result, no proposed
solution has satisfactorily accommodated the courts’ position alongside that of
the plaintiffs. Based in part on this analysis, Part III presents two theoretically
distinct approaches to this problem, ultimately advocating for choice-of-law
legislation in the United States, which most effectively acknowledges the
courts’ concerns while ensuring the plaintiffs a forum in which to litigate.
I. “COMPETING” JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINES
The idea that a court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction over a
particular case, as embodied in the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is unique
to the common law world. In contrast, the civil law system of preemptive
constitutional issue of access to the courts), and Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tex. 1990)
(Doggett, J., concurring) (deeming a specific application of FNC a “connivance to avoid corporate
accountability”). One of the most common criticisms of FNC is that it is too intolerable an obstacle to
corporate accountability. For various proposals to reformulate FNC, see Dante Figueroa, Are There Ways Out
of the Current Forum Non Conveniens Impasse Between the United States and Latin America?, BUS. L. BRIEF,
Spring 2005, at 42, 44 [hereinafter Figueroa, FNC Impasse] (acknowledging that certain modifications to the
FNC doctrine are more realistic than “calling for an entire abolition” of the doctrine), and Dante Figueroa,
Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the United States and Latin America in the Context of Forum Non
Conveniens Dismissals, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 119, 161–66 (2005) [hereinafter Figueroa, Conflicts
of Jurisdiction].
41 See Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the
Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non Conveniens as a Defense Tactic,
56 U. KAN. L. REV. 609, 609 (2008) (“A motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens has become
the primary response of domestic defendants to tort actions brought by foreign plaintiffs in U.S.
courts . . . [and is] granted[] in nearly every case.”).
42 While this Comment does not intend to decide the merits of FNC application in general, the doctrine’s
ability to adapt to modern jurisdictional dilemmas speaks to its ongoing viability in the future of international
civil litigation.
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jurisdiction accords absolute deference to a plaintiff’s choice of forum.
Section A discusses the development and modern application of FNC, with
particular attention to the policy objectives FNC is intended to advance.
Section B then introduces basic principles of civil law jurisdiction and
discusses Latin America’s recent interpretation of these principles, as
embodied in various blocking statutes.
A. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens (translating to “an unsuitable
court”43) permits a court to dismiss a case over which it has proper
jurisdiction44 when another adequate forum is substantially more convenient.45
With longstanding common law roots,46 FNC plays a prominent role in the
context of modern international litigation47 due to an increasingly global
economy and the notable appeal of U.S. courts to foreign plaintiffs.48 This
section provides an overview of FNC and its origins in the United States before
outlining the doctrine’s modern application. It then suggests an analytical
framework for understanding the policy considerations FNC seeks to balance,
which should guide our handling of the doctrine’s inadequacies in particular
contexts.
1. Origins and Overview of FNC in the United States
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the FNC doctrine as such
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,49 although acknowledging its previous acceptance
of the doctrine’s principles.50 In Gilbert, the Court appreciated that application
of FNC was necessarily discretionary but identified a number of factors to

43

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009).
The Supreme Court recently held that a court need not first establish jurisdiction over a dispute and its
litigants in order to dismiss a case under FNC. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S.
422, 455 (2007). However, FNC dismissals are most common when a court otherwise has jurisdiction.
45 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 passim (1947).
46 The doctrine, first recognized in Scotland in 1866, is widely accepted in the common law world. HAY
ET AL., supra note 14, at 187.
47 FNC still exists within the United States for dismissals to state court (from both federal and other state
courts); however, the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the federal transfer statute, has largely limited its use
domestically. HAY ET AL., supra note 14, at 208–09.
48 See infra Part I.C.
49 Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501.
50 Id. at 504 (“This Court, in one form of words or another, has repeatedly recognized the existence of the
power to decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances.”).
44
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consider in assessing the merits of an FNC dismissal.51 Gilbert contemplates
two categories of factors—the first concerning the private interest of the
litigant, and the second concerning the public interest, i.e., the convenience of
the forum.52 Unless these factors strongly favor the defendant, however, a
court should not disturb a plaintiff’s choice of forum.53
The Court confirmed the enduring relevance of FNC in 1981 with its
decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.54 In Piper, the Court refined the
proper application of the doctrine “crystallized” in Gilbert.55 Of particular
significance, the Court held that “dismissal may not be barred solely because
of the possibility of an unfavorable change in law.”56 In fact, this possibility
should not even be given “substantial weight.”57 The Court reiterated the value
of the doctrine’s flexibility and noted that such a holding would render the
doctrine useless.58 Further, the Piper Court explicitly qualified the deference
accorded a plaintiff’s choice of forum, as explicated in Gilbert: Because FNC’s
central inquiry is the convenience of the parties, and because a foreign
plaintiff’s choice of U.S. forum is less likely to be inspired by considerations
of convenience, that choice is entitled to less weight than that of a citizen
plaintiff.59 Thus, in combination, Gilbert and Piper provide the basis for
modern FNC analysis.

51

Id. at 508.
Id. at 508–09.
53 Id. at 508. The Court reiterated this sentiment in Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330
U.S. 518 (1947), decided the same day as Gilbert, but narrowed its discussion to the “good reason[s] why [a
case] should be tried in the plaintiff’s home forum if that has been his choice.” Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
Thus, as early as Gilbert and Koster, the Court seemed to contemplate different treatments for domestic and
foreign plaintiffs.
54 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
55 Id. at 248.
56 Id. at 249.
57 Id. at 247.
58 Id. at 249–50.
59 Id. at 255–56; see also Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, S.A. v. Schichau-Unterweser, A.G., 955
F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1992) (“When a plaintiff chooses a foreign forum for its claims, courts are reluctant to
assume that convenience motivated that choice.”); C.A. La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1307
(11th Cir. 1983) (“A plaintiff who chooses a foreign forum substantially undercuts the presumption his choice
is reasonable . . . .”).
52
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2. Modern Analysis of FNC
Most modern courts treat FNC analysis as a two-step process.60 To
determine whether dismissal is proper, the court will first ask whether an
adequate alternative forum exists.61 Characterizing FNC as a “doctrine
furnish[ing] criteria for choice” between “at least two forums in which the
defendant is amenable to process,” the Gilbert Court implicitly recognized the
existence of an alternative forum as a prerequisite to FNC dismissal.62 Piper
explicated Gilbert’s supposition in a footnote providing that a court must
determine that an alternative forum exists “[a]t the outset of any forum non
conveniens inquiry.”63 Once a court makes this determination, it proceeds to
apply the factors outlined in Gilbert.64 Each step of modern FNC analysis is
considered in greater depth below.
a. The Threshold Inquiry: Availability of an Adequate Alternative Forum
While “availability” and “adequacy” are often discussed jointly,65 they
have developed distinct meanings, and courts increasingly treat them as
separate inquiries.66 A forum is available when that forum has jurisdiction
over all necessary parties and no procedural bar precludes the alternative forum
from hearing the case.67 As a party’s consent is a valid basis for jurisdiction in
every forum, a defendant’s submission to the jurisdiction of a foreign court
renders that forum available.68 In contrast, a forum is unavailable where the

60 But see infra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of an adequate alternative
forum as one nondispositive factor in FNC analysis).
61 Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law: The Impact of Applying Foreign Law
in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1161, 1166 (2005).
62 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506–07 (1947).
63 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22; see also Rajeev Muttreja, Note, How to Fix the Inconsistent Application
of Forum Non Conveniens to Latin American Jurisdiction—And Why Consistency May Not Be Enough, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1607, 1611 (2008) (noting the lack of attention accorded this inquiry by the Supreme Court,
which assumed its existence in Gilbert and “relegated the issue to a footnote” in Piper).
64 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1616.
65 See, e.g., Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
66 Heiser, supra note 41, at 614.
67 Id. at 614 & n.34.
68 Anne M. Rodgers, Forum Non Conveniens in International Cases, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION:
DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN PARTIES IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 205, 206 (David J. Levy ed., 2003). For
this reason, most courts condition FNC dismissal on the defendant’s submission to the alternative forum’s
jurisdiction, as well as waiver of any statute of limitations defenses. Id. at 216. But see Leetsch v. Freedman,
260 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a district court is not required to impose conditions on an
FNC dismissal and “lack of such conditions does not render the . . . forum inadequate”).
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forum “does not permit litigation of the subject matter of the dispute.”69 In
short, a court is available unless it cannot or will not hear the case.
Regarding adequacy, as previously discussed, an unfavorable change of
law does not render an alternative forum inadequate.70 Only when “the remedy
provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that
it is no remedy at all” may the alternative forum itself be inadequate.71 For
instance, in Parex Bank v. Russian Savings Bank,72 the court held that Russia
was a “clearly unsatisfactory” forum in which to litigate claims based on a
series of contracts that were not legally cognizable under Russian law.73
Further, adequacy is necessarily a subjective inquiry.74 Perhaps for this
reason, U.S. courts are notably hesitant to determine that another country’s
court system is inadequate.75 First, only systemic prejudices or dishonesty
provide appropriate bases for finding that a forum is inadequate.76 For
instance, in Mercier v. Sheraton International, Inc., a U.S. court refused to
consider the “personal difficulties” the plaintiff might face if the case were
dismissed in favor of Turkey, because the plaintiff was unable to show any
“legal or political obstacle to the presentation of [her] testimony in the Turkish
courts.”77 In contrast, a Honduran forum was inadequate when the plaintiffs

69

Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
71 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254. However, the alternative forum is not necessarily required “to offer a judicial
remedy” in order to satisfy this requirement. Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1143–45 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding that New Zealand’s administrative remedy for plaintiffs’ product liability claims rendered that
forum adequate).
72 116 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
73 Id. at 426–27 (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22).
74 Figueroa, FNC Impasse, supra note 40, at 44 (“A forum is not adequate or inadequate per se. Rather,
it depends on the eyes of the beholder.”).
75 Heiser, supra note 61, at 1170.
76 This is true at least absent a “documented threat to the plaintiff’s safety or freedom.” Rodgers, supra
note 68, at 208.
77 981 F.2d 1345, 1350–51 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1992). However, at least one court has considered such
“personal difficulties” in weighing the private interest factors of Gilbert. In Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels
Corp., the Second Circuit held that the district court had abused its discretion in dismissing to Egypt for FNC
in part because the district court ignored the “substantial and unusual emotional burden on Plaintiffs,” who
were “widows or . . . victim[s] of a murderous act [in Egypt] directed specifically against foreigners,” if they
were required to return to litigate their case. 203 F.3d 180, 186 (2d Cir.), amended by 224 F.3d 142 (2d Cir.
2000). It is worth noting that the court’s discussion of the “ample evidence . . . giv[ing] credence to Plaintiffs’
uncertainty as to the safety of American visitors to Egypt” occurs in the context of the parties’ convenience
(i.e., the private interest factors) rather than the availability or adequacy of the forum. Id. This reflects, more
generally, courts’ cursory treatment of this threshold inquiry and caution in labeling an alternative forum
inadequate.
70
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presented evidence that the Honduran criminal process would be used to
intimidate the plaintiffs’ officers and witnesses.78 Absent such express
corruption or bias, however, procedural deficiencies including chronic delay or
backlog, underdeveloped tort law, lack of capacity to handle complex mass tort
litigation, and problems with enforcement of judgments are generally
insufficient to render another forum inadequate.79 Thus, adequacy provides a
fairly low threshold: as long as the plaintiffs are not “deprived of any remedy
or treated unfairly” by the alternative forum’s legal system, that forum is
adequate.80
b. The Public and Private Interest Factors of Gilbert: A Balancing of
Conveniences
Having established that an adequate alternative forum is available for
resolution of the dispute, the court then considers the Gilbert factors. The
purpose of the Gilbert factors is to properly balance conveniences—the court
must consider the interest each party has in proceeding in a particular forum
alongside the forum’s interest in litigating the dispute.81
In evaluating the private interest of each litigant, the court should consider
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
82
inexpensive.

The ability of a foreign plaintiff to enforce a judgment rendered in the forum
through his home court is also relevant to this inquiry.83 While a foreign

78 Honduran Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Honduras, 883 F. Supp. 685, 690 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff’d in part
and vacated in part, 119 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir.), and amended by 129 F.3d 543 (11th Cir. 1997). For additional
examples of systemic corruption rendering a foreign court inadequate, see Rodgers, supra note 68, at 208 n.21.
79 Heiser, supra note 61, at 1169–70 (discussing the litigation in In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant
Disaster at Bhopal, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), resulting from a highly toxic gas leak at a Union
Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal, India, that killed or injured more than 200,000 individuals).
80 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981).
81 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947).
82 Id. at 508.
83 Id. Interestingly, the ability of a foreign plaintiff to enforce a judgment rendered in the alternative
forum in a U.S. court is not relevant to the inquiry and has, on occasion, become problematic following an
FNC dismissal. See Christina Weston, Comment, The Enforcement Loophole: Judgment Recognition Defenses
as a Loophole to Corporate Accountability for Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 729 (2011).
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plaintiff’s choice of forum is not entitled to the same deference as that of a
citizen plaintiff,84 it is still given some weight.85 Further, that the defendant
may be engaged in reverse forum shopping should not ordinarily affect the trial
court’s analysis of the private interests.86
In contrast, the public interest factors take into account the convenience of
the forum. At least one court has characterized these factors as a guide for the
court in deciding whether to grant an FNC motion “when private equities are in
equipoise, even with the extra deference accorded to plaintiffs’ choice of
forum.”87 A court will consider the administrative difficulties it faces due to
congestion of its dockets; the burden on its citizens posed by litigation
unrelated to the forum; the local interest in having localized controversies
decided at home; and the difficulties associated with application of foreign
law.88 In this way, the doctrine of FNC aims to minimize the need for
complicated choice-of-law analysis and, ultimately, application of foreign
law.89
The application of Gilbert factors is highly fact specific, and the Court has
provided little guidance in terms of proper balancing.90 Due to the
discretionary nature of this analysis, the trial court’s determination is subject to

84

See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See Piper, 454 U.S. 235. A number of courts, however, including the Second Circuit, have held that
when a treaty between the United States and a foreign nation affords both countries’ citizens equal access to
the other’s court system, FNC analysis must treat foreign and domestic plaintiffs identically. Rodgers, supra
note 68, at 209 n.27 (citing Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venezuela, S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 981 (2d Cir. 1993)).
86 Piper, 454 U.S. at 252 n.19. This is premised on the idea that one forum is objectively better (i.e.,
substantially more convenient) than another forum and each party’s motive is not relevant to this
determination. But see Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (advising courts to look
at the plaintiff’s “likely motivations in light of all the relevant indications” when determining how much
deference to accord a plaintiff’s decision).
87 Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Snaza v. Howard Johnson
Franchise Sys., Inc., No. 3-07-CV-0495-O, 2008 WL 5383155, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2008) (“Only if a
court concludes that dismissal is not appropriate based upon its review of the private interest factors, must it
then weigh the public interest factors.”).
88 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508–09.
89 See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1180–82 (interpreting the Court’s formulation of the FNC doctrine to
encourage courts to dismiss for FNC in order to avoid a choice-of-law determination and application of foreign
law).
90 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1616–17.
85
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a highly deferential standard of review.91 In effect, then, a higher court will
rarely disturb the trial court’s decision to grant or deny an FNC dismissal.92
3. Policy Considerations of FNC
As stated by the Gilbert Court, “The principle of forum non conveniens is
simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when
jurisdiction is authorized . . . .”93 Relying largely on a law review article
lamenting the congested dockets of New York courts,94 the Gilbert Court
designated FNC as a tool to prevent plaintiffs from choosing an inconvenient
forum to “vex, harass, or oppress” the defendant.95 Yet this narrow concern
hardly explains the outcome in numerous cases in which courts grant an FNC
dismissal when the chosen forum appears primarily inconvenient for the
plaintiffs, not the defendants. For instance, a foreign plaintiff’s decision to sue
a defendant-corporation in the state of its headquarters is hardly an
“oppressive” one, at least in terms of the defendant’s convenience in litigating.
This outcome is largely explained by U.S. courts’ longstanding concern
with forum shopping, “the practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction
or court in which a claim might be heard.”96 A particularly useful definition in
the international context, forum shopping is understood as a plaintiff’s
“passing his natural forum and bringing his action in some alien
forum . . . which would give him relief or benefit which would not be available
to him in his natural forum.”97 The inherent assumption is that the litigant

91 Piper, 454 U.S. at 257 (“The forum non conveniens determination . . . may be reversed only when
there has been a clear abuse of discretion . . . .”).
92 This outcome is criticized as highly problematic, both in terms of predictability and fairness. For an
interesting proposal to heighten the standard of review as to the preliminary question of whether an adequate
alternative forum exists, see Alina Alonso & David L. Luck, Toward a More “Convenient” Standard of
Review in Cases Involving Forum Non Conveniens Issues, FLA. BAR J., Jan. 2010, at 40. The authors argue
that this inquiry involves purely legal issues and questions of foreign law, usually reviewed de novo. Id. at
40–41. The abuse of discretion review prescribed by the Piper Court thus pertained only to the lower court’s
balancing of Gilbert factors. Id.
93 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507.
94 Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1929).
95 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508 (quoting Blair, supra note 94) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]
plaintiff sometimes is under temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place
for an adversary, even at some inconvenience to himself.” Id. at 507.
96 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009).
97 MICHAEL KARAYANNI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE MODERN AGE: A COMPARATIVE AND
METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 132 (2004) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
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purposely overlooks a more appropriate forum in order to reap the benefits of a
less appropriate forum.98
Forum shopping is of particular concern in the United States due to the
numerous procedural and substantive advantages offered plaintiffs by U.S.
courts. Many procedural and systemic advantages are, for the most part,
unique to the American legal system. These include extensive pretrial
discovery, conspicuously plaintiff-friendly juries, the contingency fee system,
large damage awards, and relatively efficient disposition and enforcement of
judgments.99
However, beyond advantages in procedure, perhaps the most appealing
aspect of litigating in the United States is application of substantive U.S. tort
law.100 U.S. tort law is grounded in strict liability rather than negligence,
damage awards compensate for both economic and non-economic injuries and,
on top of these, punitive damages are also available.101 As the majority of
international litigation in the United States involves foreign torts,102 these
features have the potential to seriously affect the outcome of a case.103 The
lower costs of litigating coupled with the higher potential for recovery make
the United States a “magnet forum” for foreign plaintiffs.104 FNC, then, is a
judicial response recognizing that, in deciding where to file, a foreign
plaintiff’s desire to litigate in the United States may overshadow important
considerations of convenience.
In particular, courts attempt to mitigate the consequences of forum
shopping through measured application of the Gilbert factors.105 While trying
to reconcile multiple, often incompatible interests—those of each litigant and
98

Id.
Heiser, supra note 41, at 618–19; Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1618; see also ANDREW BELL, FORUM
SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 29 (2003) (highlighting low filing fees, the possibility
of class actions, liberal joinder rules, and relatively loose rules of pleading as further draws of the American
system).
100 Of course, the underlying assumption is that a U.S. court will apply domestic law to the dispute.
Heiser, supra note 61, at 1163. For consideration of the correctness of this assumption, and its consequences,
see infra Part IV.B.
101 Heiser, supra note 41, at 619.
102 Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 560 (1989).
103 See generally Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 21 (2004) (noting that due to numerous procedural deficiencies in Latin America,
plaintiffs’ claims are less likely vindicated).
104 Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: Demagnetizing the United States Forum,
52 ARK. L. REV. 157, 162 (1999); Weintraub, supra note 33, at 352.
105 See supra Part I.B.2.
99
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those of the forum106—courts simultaneously value these competing interests
by according deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum only when that choice
stems from legitimate considerations.107 In resolving that choice-of-law and
similar concerns are inherently illegitimate,108 a court may employ the Gilbert
factors to protect against forum shopping and dismiss a case brought by a
plaintiff who “unfairly exploits jurisdictional or venue rules to affect the
outcome of a lawsuit.”109 The ability to dismiss these cases to a substantially
more convenient foreign forum preserves judicial resources and protects the
legitimate interests of the defendant.110
If forum shopping were the only relevant policy concern, however, a
court’s power to dismiss for FNC would be absolute. Instead, FNC dismissals
are limited in a significant way: a court may only dismiss a case when another
forum is both available and adequate.111 This doctrinal formulation reveals a
competing policy consideration, more valuable than a court’s ability to control
its dockets or prevent forum shopping112—a plaintiff’s right to have his case
heard. As a result, a U.S. court should not dismiss a case over which it has
proper jurisdiction—no matter how tangentially related to the forum—unless
another court will hear that case.

106

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947); see also Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1617–18
(defining the “two distinct policy goals that can be aligned but are often in tension” as the court’s dual interests
in “respect[ing] a plaintiff’s choice of forum” and “ensur[ing] that the trial is convenient”).
107 Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001).
108 Heiser, supra note 61, at 1168 n.33 (“[T]he more it appears that the plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. forum
was motivated by forum shopping reasons . . . the less deference the plaintiff’s choice commands.” (second
alteration in original) (quoting Iragorri, 274 F.3d at 72)). Whether this is a fair assumption depends in part on
one’s reading of Piper. While the Piper Court discusses the need to alleviate the burden on American courts,
“already extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs,” Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251–52 (1981),
Piper seems to suggest that forum shopping is not, in itself, improper. In fact, in reasoning that an unfavorable
change in law is irrelevant to FNC dismissal, the Piper Court acknowledges without judgment that plaintiffs
often “select that forum whose choice-of-law rules are most advantageous.” Id. at 250. This sort of forum
shopping is only a problem if it leads the plaintiff to file in a substantially less convenient forum. Thus, the
appropriate question is not whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping, but whether the selected forum is
most appropriate.
109 Juenger, supra note 102, at 553. The forum shopping concern is thus premised on the idea that “the
plaintiff screens the different jurisdictions and then decides to file suit in the forum that will grant the most
favorable resolution of the pending dispute.” KARAYANNI, supra note 97, at 132.
110 KARAYANNI, supra note 97, at 135.
111 See supra Part I.A.1.
112 If these considerations were equally valuable, deliberation of the Gilbert factors would not depend on
finding another forum in which the plaintiffs could litigate.
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B. Latin American Preemptive Legislation
Basic principles of civil law jurisdiction are markedly different from their
common law counterparts. As FNC dismissals to Latin America become
increasingly common, numerous Latin American countries have acted to
counter the doctrine’s adverse effects on their legal systems. Through “judicial
retaliation” and “blocking statutes,”113 these countries attempt to hinder U.S.
courts from dismissing for FNC cases brought by Latin American plaintiffs.
This section introduces traditional principles of civil law jurisdiction and the
blocking statutes supposedly based on these principles.
1. Civil Law Preemptive Jurisdiction
The concept that a court holds the discretionary power to dismiss a case
over which it has proper jurisdiction is foreign to civil law regimes, which
include most Latin American countries.114 In contrast to the common law
tradition, the basis and scope of civilian judicial jurisdiction are established
exclusively by national codes of civil procedure.115 These statutes appreciate a
plaintiff’s initial choice of forum as absolute, so long as the plaintiff files in a
court competent to hear the case according to both the civil law jurisdiction
and the legal system in which the case is filed.116 Jurisdiction is generally
proper in “the defendant’s domicile, the defendant’s place of business, and the
place where the harm occurred.”117 If a plaintiff initially files in one of these
places, then, under the Latin American rules of civil procedure, the court
cannot decline to hear the case.118
Because civil law gives categorical deference to a plaintiff’s choice of
forum, a civil law court will decline jurisdiction over a claim initially filed by
113

See supra note 38.
Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1619. Latin American civil procedure developed from various continental
European systems and maintains the same basic principles. RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI,
FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 128 (2007).
115 BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 114, at 121 (“The concept of forum non conveniens is generally
inconsistent with civil law systems in which there is a belief in the predictability of comprehensive procedure
codes created by the legislature and the absence of all but minimal discretion in the role of the judge.”); see
also Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: “Availability” and “Adequacy” of Latin American Fora
from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 65, 70 (2003).
116 E.E. Daschbach, Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way: The Cause for a Cure and Remedial
Prescriptions for Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in Latin American Plaintiffs’ Actions Against U.S.
Multinationals, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AMERICAS 11, 29 (2007).
117 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1620.
118 Id. at 1620 & n.75.
114
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the plaintiff in another civil law court.119 In effect, then, the plaintiff’s
decision to file in a particular court acts to strip all other civil law courts
having concurrent jurisdiction of their right to hear the case.120 Still, most civil
law jurisdictions recognize the plaintiff’s right to redirect the case to another
competent court at his discretion.121 This choice, so long as made “freely,
unequivocally, and voluntarily by the plaintiff,” revives the latter court’s
jurisdiction.122
2. Latin American Blocking Statutes
Based on this preemptive system, many Latin American countries123 have
recently decided that FNC dismissals have intolerable implications for their
legal systems.124 While some rely exclusively on their national codes of
procedure, many countries have enacted blocking statutes making explicit the
perceived consequences of their jurisdictional rules125: Once a claim is validly
filed in the defendant’s domiciliary court, the jurisdiction of the plaintiff’s
119

This concept is similar to, but distinct from, the civil law concept of lis pendens, which requires that
one court stay proceedings on an issue being tried in another court. See HAY ET AL., supra note 14, at 207. A
final FNC dismissal to Latin America would raise a lis pendens issue only if the U.S. court retained continuing
jurisdiction over the suit. Dahl, supra note 103, at 29. However, as the Second Circuit made clear in In re
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, “Once a U.S. court dismisses . . . proceedings on grounds of forum
non conveniens it ceases to have any further jurisdiction over the matter . . . .” 809 F.2d 195, 205 (2d Cir.
1987) (characterizing the defendant’s suggestion otherwise as “not only impractical but evidenc[ing] an
abysmal ignorance of basic jurisdictional principles”). Thus, the basic justification for the Latin American
blocking statutes must be the doctrine of preemptive jurisdiction rather than lis pendens.
120 Figueroa, FNC Impasse, supra note 40, at 44. While this statement is accurate, the distinction made in
the preceding sentence is important. It is not the plaintiff’s actions that strip a second court of jurisdiction;
rather, based on the civil law concepts of lis pendens and preemptive jurisdiction, the second court chooses not
to accept the case. See infra Part II.B.1.
121 Garro, supra note 115, at 70.
122 Id.
123 For the purpose of this Comment, Latin America refers to those Latin American countries having
enacted some form of blocking statute, including Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica,
and others who have interpreted their national codes to the same end. Collective treatment of these countries is
appropriate due to the common origins of their statutes or interpretations—that is, Latin America’s civil law
rules of preemptive jurisdiction. For independent consideration of each regime, see Dahl, supra note 103, app.
at 47–63. Notably, many larger, more developed countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, do
not have blocking statutes in place and have not construed their national codes to conflict with the FNC
doctrine in the United States. Michael Wallace Gordon, Forum Non Conveniens Misconstrued: A Response to
Henry Saint Dahl, 38 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 141, 142 (2006).
124 See Dahl, supra note 103, at 21 (noting the “illegal effects” of FNC dismissals for Latin America).
125 For this reason, the term retaliatory legislation, which has emerged to describe these statutes, is a
misnomer insofar as it suggests that the concept of preemptive legislation, in its entirety, is a response to FNC
in the United States and like doctrines. However, certain Latin American statutes specifically target “product
injury cases brought by Latin American plaintiffs against U.S. defendants in U.S. courts, for torts arising out of
the defendants’ activities in Latin America.” Figueroa, FNC Impasse, supra note 40, at 45.
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national court is effectively extinguished.126 Accordingly, once a Latin
American plaintiff files a claim against a U.S. defendant in the United States,
the plaintiff’s home court can no longer hear the case.127
Nor does the equation change should the U.S. court dismiss for FNC. In
this instance, only the plaintiff’s voluntary refiling would revive national
jurisdiction; however, the blocking statutes consider a plaintiff’s decision to
refile in Latin America following an FNC dismissal abroad to be inherently
involuntary.128 Rather, an FNC dismissal forces a plaintiff to refile and thus
cannot revive jurisdiction of the Latin American national court.129
For example, Parlamento Latinoamericano (the Latin American Parliament
or Parlatino), an influential regional Parliament integrated from the national
Parliaments of Latin American and Caribbean nations,130 enacted the Model
Law on International Jurisdiction and Applicable Law to Tort Liability on
January 27, 1998.131 Before introducing the text of the Model Law, the statute
clarifies certain existing legal principles on which it rests—namely, that “the

126

See supra Part I.B.
Figueroa, FNC Impasse, supra note 40, at 44.
128 Dahl, supra note 103, at 24. This is also the position of Parlatino’s Model Law, see infra text
accompanying notes 130–36, so this stance is also assumed by those countries that follow it.
129 Id. at 24–25 (“FNC forces the plaintiff to re-file the case . . . [such that the] filing is not the product of
the plaintiff’s free and spontaneous will. . . . The plaintiff who re-files in Latin America . . . is compelled or
coerced by the FNC order.” (footnotes omitted)). Another Latin American response to FNC is the enactment
of retaliatory legislation that extends jurisdiction to Latin American countries over cases dismissed abroad
under FNC and permits them to import the law of the dismissing country in adjudicating the case. Winston
Anderson, Forum Non Conveniens Checkmated? The Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. TRANSNAT’L
L. & POL’Y 183, 186 (2001) (noting that the legislatures in the Caribbean Commonwealth, where it was
impossible to extinguish the jurisdiction of their national courts, enacted statutes permitting their local courts
“to utilize the rules of evidence, liability, and award damages available to foreign courts”). For instance, a
Dominican statute “unreservedly accepts jurisdiction in a FNC situation.” Dahl, supra note 97, at 24. Thus,
following a dismissal in the United States under FNC, the court might impose strict liability on an American
corporate defendant, or subject the defendant to a determination of compensatory damages according to
American standards. Daschbach, supra note 116, at 57. These statutes only become relevant once a case is
dismissed abroad for FNC; thus, they operate less to “make Latin American courts a more appealing forum for
Latin American plaintiffs” than to make Latin American courts a less desirable alternative for U.S. defendants.
Id.
130 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1623 n.87.
131 LEY MODELO SOBRE COMPETENCIA INTERNACIONAL Y DERECHO APLICABLE A LA RESPONSABILIDAD
EXTRACONTRACTUAL [MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW TO TORT
LIABILITY] art. 1 (Permanent Forum of Reg’l Parliaments for the Env’t & for a Sustainable Dev., Latin Am.
Parliament 1998) [hereinafter MODEL LAW], available in English at http://www.iaba.org/LLinks_forum_non_
Parlatino.htm, translated in HENRY SAINT DAHL, DAHL’S LAW DICTIONARY/DICCIONARIO JURIDICO DAHL:
SPANISH-ENGLISH/ENGLISH-SPANISH: AN ANNOTATED LEGAL DICTIONARY, INCLUDING AUTHORITATIVE
DEFINITIONS 242 (4th ed. 2006).
127
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choice of forum made by the plaintiff must be strengthened”132 and, citing to
Article 323 of the Bustamante Code,133 that “in personal actions . . . the
defendant’s domiciliary court [has] jurisdiction.”134 So premised, Article 1 of
the Model Law states: “The petition that is validly filed, according to both
legal systems, in the defendant’s domiciliary court, extinguishes national
jurisdiction. The latter is only reborn if the plaintiff desists of his foreign
petition and files a new petition in the country, in a completely free and
spontaneous way.”135 As discussed, a plaintiff’s refiling following an FNC
dismissal abroad is not considered “free and spontaneous” for this purpose.136
A number of Latin American countries, including Ecuador and Guatemala,
have modeled their blocking statutes on this Model Code.137 Importantly,
these statutes all share one thing in common: they explicitly intend to respond
to, and to frustrate, FNC dismissals abroad. As noted by the Parlatino statute,
it “makes sure that . . . a foreign court with jurisdiction . . . will not be able to
close the doors of the courts on [a Latin American plaintiff] as, for instance,
has been happening with the theory of forum non conveniens.”138 Similarly,
the Guatemalan statute states that “the ‘Theory of Forum Non Conveniens’ by
foreign judges . . . makes it necessary to enact a law that controls the
applicability of legal theories unknown in our system . . . .”139 It is in this
context that U.S. courts must decide whether to continue dismissing to Latin
America for FNC.

132

Id. at introductory cmt., translated in Dahl, supra note 103, app. at 47.
The Bustamante Code is an international treaty that attempts to codify conflict of laws. Ratified by
fourteen Latin American countries (and Cuba), the United States nonetheless refused to ratify it. Alejandro M.
Garro, Unification and Harmonization of Private Law in Latin America, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 587, 591–92,
nn.16 & 17 (1992).
134 MODEL LAW, supra note 131, at introductory cmt., translated in Dahl, supra note 103, app. at 47.
135 Id.
136 See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. Similarly, a plaintiff who refiles in Venezuela after
an FNC dismissal does not “expressly or tacitly” submit to Venezuela’s jurisdiction, as required by Article
40(4) of the Venezuelan International Private Law Statute (VIPLS). Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1626. Thus,
Venezuela does not have jurisdiction over the case. Id.
137 Ecuador’s statute was declared unconstitutional, as was part of Guatemala’s. Dahl, supra note 103, at
23; see supra text accompanying notes 184–86.
138 MODEL LAW, supra note 131, at introductory cmt., translated in Dahl, supra note 103, app. at 47.
139 Law for the Defense of Procedural Rights of Nationals and Residents, May 14, 1997 (Guat.), available
at http://www.iaba.org/LLinks_forum_non_Guatemala.htm, translated in Dahl, supra note 103, app. at 48.
133
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II. FNC MOTIONS TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES WITH BLOCKING
STATUTES: AN EXPLANATION OF U.S. COURTS’ ANALYSES
The message of these blocking statutes seems clear: A Latin American
court will not hear a case dismissed abroad under FNC. Yet U.S. courts reach
inconsistent outcomes in determining whether a Latin American court is
“available” for purposes of an FNC dismissal, as section A briefly discusses.140
While numerous commentators have noted this inconsistency, few have
adequately considered why certain courts insist on continuing to dismiss for
FNC to Latin America, an outcome that seems obviously improper. Instead,
posturing these statutes as mere reiterations of foundational concepts in civil
law,141 commentators assume that these decisions simply reflect the courts’
failure to appreciate crucial differences between the systems of jurisdiction, or
refusal to accept the same.
Section B argues that the results achieved by these blocking statutes are not
inherent in traditional rules of civil law jurisdiction, largely explaining the
hesitance of U.S. courts to accept that they can no longer dismiss to Latin
America. Instead, these statutes reinterpret civil law principles, ensuring that
U.S. courts must deny FNC motions brought against Latin American plaintiffs.
So portrayed, the courts’ discomfort with these statutes is easier to understand,
and the need for a solution acknowledging the courts’ concerns becomes
apparent.
A. Actual and Ideal Treatment by U.S. Courts of FNC Dismissals to Latin
America
Whether a court will grant an FNC motion to a Latin American country
with a blocking statute is largely unpredictable. These statutes overtly intend
to clarify that the Latin American country will not accept jurisdiction over a
case once dismissed by a U.S. court for FNC.142 As FNC dismissal
“presupposes at least two forums” in which a case may be heard,143 a U.S.
court must decide whether these statutes effectively eliminate one forum.

140

For more exhaustive analysis of U.S. courts’ inconsistent treatment of FNC motions when faced with
Latin American preemptive legislation, see Muttreja, supra note 63. Muttreja argues for an “honest”
application of the FNC doctrine, obligating courts to deny dismissals to Latin America. Id. at 1607.
141 See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 138–39.
143 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
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Latin American countries clearly intended for their blocking statutes to have
this effect, as so concluding prevents a U.S. court from dismissing for FNC.144
And many courts have indeed reached this conclusion, treating the blocking
statutes as evidence that no alternative forum exists and refusing dismissal on
this basis. For instance, in Canales Martinez v. Dow Chemical Co.,145 the
court relied on the Costa Rica Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) to hold that
Costa Rica was not an adequate alternative forum.146 Article 31 of the CCP
states: “If there were two or more courts with jurisdiction for one case, it will
be tried by the one who heard it first at the plaintiff’s request.”147 By operation
of plaintiffs’ filing in the United States, the court reasoned, CCP Article 31 had
divested Costa Rican courts of jurisdiction.148 Further, Articles 122 and 477 of
the CCP only recognize claims as valid if they are filed “freely and
voluntarily”; by dismissing for FNC, “the [U.S. court] would be forcing the
plaintiffs to try to file the lawsuit in Costa Rica in violation of articles 122 and
477.”149 Thus, an FNC dismissal was inappropriate.
The plaintiffs in In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,150 where the court
considered a motion to dismiss to Venezuela, succeeded with a similar
argument. Here, the plaintiffs asserted that, in combination, several provisions
of the Venezuelan International Private Law Statutes (VIPLS) would preclude
a Venezuelan court from assuming jurisdiction over their tort claim, once
dismissed for FNC.151 Relying on the plaintiffs’ expert affidavits, the court
rejected the defendants’ argument that defendants’ willingness to consent to
jurisdiction in Venezuela was in itself sufficient to confer jurisdiction on its
court.152 So finding, the court denied their motion for FNC dismissal.153

144

See supra notes 138–39.
219 F. Supp. 2d 719 (E.D. La. 2002).
146 Id. at 728.
147 Id.; see also BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 114, at 136.
148 Canales Martinez, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
149 Id.
150 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
151 Id. at 1131–32.
152 Id. In particular, the following statutes were at issue: Article 39, providing the defendant’s domicile as
the first forum for bringing suit; Article 40(2), relating specifically to jurisdiction in personal injury cases with
nondomiciliary defendants; and Article 40(4), permitting Venezuelan courts jurisdiction over cases against
nondomiciliaries if both parties submit to jurisdiction. Id.; see also Carl Schroeter GmbH & KO., KG. v.
Crawford & Co., No. 09-946, 2009 WL 1408100, at *7–8 (E.D. Pa. May 19, 2009) (discussing the In re
Bridgestone/Firestone decision and concluding, in light of the Venezuelan legislation, that defendant failed to
establish Venezuela as an adequate alternative forum).
153 In re Bridgestone/Firestone, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
145
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Yet other courts have granted FNC dismissals on similar facts.154 In Rivas
ex rel. Estate of Gutierrez v. Ford Motor Co.,155 a wrongful death action
against Ford Motor Company resulting from a car accident in Venezuela, the
court explicitly found the Bridgestone/Firestone reasoning unpersuasive.
Instead, the court accepted defendants’ expert testimony to conclude that
Venezuela’s courts were available for subsequent litigation.156 So too did the
court in Morales v. Ford Motor Co.,157 another products liability case brought
by Venezuelan plaintiffs against the American car manufacturer for an
accident occurring in Venezuela.158 Despite expert affidavits indicating that
plaintiffs’ decision to file first in the United States effectively stripped
Venezuela of jurisdiction over the case, the court held defendants’ unilateral
submission to the jurisdiction of the Venezuelan courts, alone, was sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on Venezuelan courts.159
The Morales court seemed particularly dissatisfied with the necessary
implication of the plaintiffs’ argument: “Venezuelan plaintiffs have the option
of rendering their home courts unavailable simply by bringing suits such as
this one outside of their own country.”160 Other courts have echoed this
sentiment, revealing a likely explanation for finding a Latin American forum
available despite persuasive evidence to the contrary. To determine that Latin
American preemptive legislation precludes FNC dismissal “would place an
undue burden on . . . courts forcing them to accept foreign-based actions
unrelated to th[e] State merely because a more appropriate forum is
unwilling . . . to accept jurisdiction.”161 In short, FNC initially developed “to

154 Many of these courts have conditioned dismissal on the alternative forum’s willingness to hear the
case. If the alternative forum refuses jurisdiction, the plaintiff can refile in the United States without prejudice.
See, e.g., Abad v. Bayer Corp., 563 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2009); Chandler v. Multidata Sys. Int’l Corp., 163
S.W.3d 537, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
155 No. 8:02 CV-676-T-17 EAJ, 2004 WL 1247018 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2004).
156 Id. at *4. The defendants had submitted additional expert affidavits and “learned from [key] mistakes
of Bridgestone/Firestone.” BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 114, at 138.
157 313 F. Supp. 2d 672 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
158 Id. at 677.
159 Id. at 676.
160 Id. For more comprehensive coverage of these Venezuelan decisions, see Muttreja, supra note 63.
161 Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 249 (N.Y. 1984). Unlike the other cases
referenced here, this court considered FNC dismissal to Iran. Based in part on the above-quoted reasoning, the
court upheld the lower court’s dismissal in spite of Iran’s political situation under the Khomeini regime. Id. at
248, 250. Importantly, however, the Pahlavi court acknowledged the possibility that no other forum existed
and chose to dismiss anyway, id. at 250; the other courts, in contrast, did not consider the Latin American
forums unavailable.
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resist . . . imposition upon [a particular] jurisdiction”;162 blocking statutes
appear to be just this imposition.
However defensible this concern, these courts incorrectly apply the FNC
doctrine to reach this outcome. In doing so, they deny the plaintiffs a forum in
which to litigate, appreciated by the Gilbert and Piper Courts as an absolute
right.163 Thus, assessment of availability must proceed based on the foreign
forum’s interpretation of its own rules rather than a U.S. court’s interpretation
of the same. If the purpose of the availability inquiry is to ensure plaintiffs
have another forum in which to litigate, a U.S. court’s determination that such
forum should be available is irrelevant if, in fact, that forum won’t be
available.164 Nor is reliance on conditional dismissals in order to avoid
properly analyzing the other forum’s availability consistent with the
doctrine;165 a court that refuses to engage in a good-faith attempt of this sort
invites unending litigation to the detriment of all involved parties. Based on
the current formulation of FNC and Latin America’s own understanding of its
jurisdiction, then, a U.S. court should deny an FNC dismissal to Latin America
because that forum is no longer available.166
B. How Blocking Statutes Alter Traditional Civil Law Rules of Preemptive
Jurisdiction in Latin America: An Explanation of U.S. Courts’ Behavior
In view of the reasoning above, many commentators suggest that U.S.
courts must simply accept these cases; the plaintiffs have nowhere else to go,
and proper application of the FNC doctrine thus demands it. To support this
position, its advocates often assert that Latin America’s blocking statutes
merely reaffirm principles of preemptive jurisdiction, a fundamental concept in
civil law procedure.167 By implication, this conflict is unavoidable, and the
U.S. court must forfeit certain rights—in particular, its right to decline
jurisdiction—in the interest of comity.

162 Seales v. Panamanian Aviation Co., No. CV-07-2901 (CPS) (CLP), 2008 WL 544705, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 2008) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
163 See supra Part I.B.1.
164 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1627–28, 1634–35 (“The American take on Venezuelan jurisdictional rules
means nothing in Venezuela . . . .”).
165 Id. at 1634–35 (“U.S. courts . . . . have not always conducted a thorough inquiry into the alternative
forum’s rules of jurisdiction, instead using conditional dismissals as a way to assume, rather than analyze, the
other forum’s availability while hedging against the possibility of that assumption being wrong.”).
166 Heiser, supra note 41, at 625–26; Muttreja, supra note 61, at 1634–35.
167 See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
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This section argues that this common conception of blocking statutes
misrepresents their relationships to the original principles from which they
derive. Rather than merely reiterate traditional concepts of civil law
jurisdiction, these statutes reinterpret these concepts to achieve a desired end.
So recognizing reveals legitimate interests that some courts seek to protect
through incorrect application of FNC. Any potential solution must consider
these interests in order to achieve an outcome that courts perceive as fair and
are thus willing to follow.
1. Latin American Blocking Statutes: Civil Law Jurisdiction Reinterpreted
The prevailing view is that Latin American blocking statutes do nothing
more than spell out existing law. Parlatino, for instance, asserts that the
purpose of its Model Law is “to clarify and to systematize” “two norms [that]
are already incorporated in the majority of [Latin American] legal systems, but
in a disperse way.”168 In citing to “classic Roman law” as the origin of these
norms,169 Parlatino implies that this legislation merely reflects age-old rules of
civil law jurisdiction. Numerous academics concur, portraying Latin American
blocking statutes as clarifying preexisting rules of preemptive jurisdiction
rather than changing those rules.170 While these statutes are certainly premised
on specific longstanding principles of civil law jurisdiction, this
characterization at least oversimplifies the nature of these statutes and, in doing
so, minimizes their effect on the outcome of cases facing FNC dismissal to
Latin America.
More accurately, these blocking statutes reflect certain interpretive choices
on the part of Latin American legislatures such that they differ from, or at least
expand on, their civil law origins.171 As discussed, Latin America’s construct

168

MODEL LAW, supra note 131, at introductory cmt., translated in Dahl, supra note 103, app. at 47.
Id. Accordingly, a Latin American plaintiff resisting FNC dismissal will argue both that the relevant
blocking statute prohibits his home court from assuming jurisdiction and, regardless, that his country’s
codified doctrine of preemptive jurisdiction dictates the same result. See, e.g., Paulownia Plantations de Pan.
Corp. v. Rajamannan, No. A07-2199, 2009 WL 3644186, at *5 (Minn. Nov. 5, 2009).
170 See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 103, at 42 (“[T]he blocking statutes are not indispensable to dismiss cases
filed in pursuance of a FNC order. This is so because the illegalities of FNC . . . are more than sufficient to
prevent jurisdiction from accruing, even without a law specifically making such point.”); Garro, supra note
115, at 78 (“This statutory scheme appears not only unnecessary but also counterproductive.”); Muttreja, supra
note 63, at 1620 n.74, 1623–24 (“Blocking statutes aim only to make a country’s jurisdictional rules clear; they
do not actually change those rules.”).
171 This does not mean to imply that these statutes are the first or only incarnation of this interpretation.
As previously discussed, courts have recently relied on their national codes to reach the same outcome as that
169
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of jurisdiction is founded on two central tenets of civil law jurisdiction: first,
that jurisdiction is proper in a defendant’s domicile, and second, that a
plaintiff’s filing in a court with proper jurisdiction is final—i.e., not subject to
the court’s discretion—and thus another court will not accept the same case.172
Based on these two principles, once a plaintiff files in a Latin American
defendant’s domiciliary court, that court does not have discretion to dismiss
the case, and all other Latin American courts relinquish their jurisdiction.173 In
this way, one court’s loss of jurisdiction is premised on another court’s
inability to dismiss a particular case. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that a
plaintiff’s filing in a U.S. court having such discretion, according to its own
law, permanently extinguishes a Latin American court’s jurisdiction, the
outcome achieved by these blocking statutes. Reaching this conclusion
requires an additional step—in this case, the active decision of a Latin
American legislature to hold that its concept of preemptive jurisdiction applies
extraterritorially as well, regardless of the foreign judiciary’s laws and concept
of jurisdiction.174 In other words, a civil law jurisdiction’s refusal to recognize
the FNC doctrine when applied by a common law court is separate from that
jurisdiction’s inability to apply the same.175 The latter is inherent in
longstanding principles of civil law; the former is not, and this is what the
blocking statutes embody.
Further, the traditional civil law rule that the plaintiff’s filing in one court
terminates the jurisdiction of all other courts only applies so long as the
plaintiff’s claim is pending before that first court. Civil law jurisdictions—like
common law jurisdictions—recognize the plaintiff’s right to change his mind,

achieved by the blocking statutes. See supra note 170. Again, the term blocking statutes intends to encompass
the discussion of this interpretative trend more generally.
172 See supra Part I.B.1.
173 See supra Part I.B.1.
174 BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 114, at 140 (“The Latin American experience indicates not only
denial of any power to decline jurisdiction in national courts but legislative efforts to prevent U.S. courts from
exercising such power under the forum non conveniens doctrine.”); see also supra text accompanying notes
22–23. This is not to say that Latin America’s decision is wrong—the United States continues to follow its
tradition of FNC despite the fact that its application is problematic for other countries that do not recognize the
doctrine. The point is that portraying Latin America’s rejection of cases dismissed for FNC as an inevitable
consequence of civil law jurisdictional principles ignores that Latin America has made certain affirmative
decisions that depart from, or at least further develop, these basic principles.
175 For instance, a Nicaraguan court held “[its] procedural system does not recognize, and therefore it does
not accept nor does it admit, the imposition of the Forum Non Conveniens Theory by foreign courts.” Dahl,
supra note 103, at 30 n.44 (quoting the Nicaraguan case of Reynaldo Aguilera Heute v. Shell Oil Co.). This
statement rests on unsound logic—namely, the assumption that acceptance of another country’s use of a
doctrine depends on recognition of that doctrine within one’s own legal system.
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to dismiss the case in one forum and refile in another. Many blocking statutes
acknowledge this, permitting revival of a court’s jurisdiction should parties
submit “in a completely free and spontaneous way.”176 In interpreting these
statutes, however, Latin American courts construe “free and spontaneous” to
exclude any situation in which the plaintiff refiles following an FNC dismissal
abroad.177 These courts reason that, in effect, an FNC dismissal coerces the
plaintiff’s refiling such that his decision is forced rather than an act of his own
free will, as required.178
Of course, Latin American courts are permitted to so reason. However, this
reasoning is not intrinsic to civil law concepts of jurisdiction; rather, it relies
on a particular characterization of the FNC dismissal and a specific (and
idealistic) understanding of voluntary. Each is a deliberate legislative choice
enabling the desired outcome—the inability of Latin American courts to
exercise jurisdiction over cases dismissed abroad for FNC.
First, interpreting an FNC dismissal to “order” a plaintiff to refile plainly
distorts the dismissal’s actual effect. In reality, its only certain consequence is
that a U.S. court will not hear the case. By its terms, then, an FNC dismissal
does not coerce or compel a plaintiff to do anything, including to refile in a
Latin American court. Holding otherwise requires two additional inferences:
(1) that a plaintiff, left with the option to refile or have his claim unheard, will
invariably choose to refile and (2) that a court, having left a plaintiff with this
option, has compelled such refiling. Certainly these are reasonable inferences,
but they are by no means inevitable. In view of the actual operation of an FNC
dismissal, a Latin American legislature could just as rightly classify a
plaintiff’s refiling as voluntary. Similarly, the idea that “voluntary” inherently
implies an action uninfluenced by any external force is both unprecedented and
unrealistic. Without this particular understanding of FNC and novel definition
of voluntary, a plaintiff submitting to Latin American jurisdiction following an
FNC dismissal would revive that court’s jurisdiction.179
Two additional realities further compromise the assertion that blocking
statutes merely reflect principles otherwise inherent in civil law jurisdictions.
First, other civil law countries are willing to accept cases dismissed in the

176

See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 131, 133.
179 This forum is otherwise appropriate for jurisdiction, according to Latin American law, because it is the
place where the harm occurred. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
177
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United States for FNC. For instance, based on the civil law tradition that
originated in Europe,180 Brussels I prohibits any member of the European
Union from dismissing for FNC.181 Yet, U.S. courts routinely dismiss cases to
European countries,182 which do not interpret their jurisdictional systems to
demand that they refuse these cases.183 In other words, these countries
interpret their ability to dismiss for FNC (or lack thereof) as distinct from their
ability to entertain cases dismissed elsewhere under this doctrine. This, of
course, suggests that Latin America’s contrary position is independent from,
rather than intrinsic to, traditional civil law concepts.
Further, more than one Latin American country has declared parts of the
blocking statutes enacted by its legislatures unconstitutional.184 For instance,
Ecuador enacted its blocking statute—an “Interpretive Law”—in 1998,
explaining the purported operation of Articles 27 through 30 of its Code of
Civil Procedure:
Without prejudice to their literal meaning, [these] articles shall be
interpreted in the sense that in case of concurrent international
jurisdiction, the plaintiff may freely choose between bringing suit
in Ecuador or in a foreign country . . . . [but i]f a suit were to be
filed outside Ecuador, the national competence and jurisdiction of
Ecuadorian courts shall be definitely extinguished.185
In April 2002, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Tribunal declared this statute
unconstitutional “for reasons of form and substance.”186 It is difficult to
180 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 2 (3d ed. 2007) (tracing the origins
of the “civil law tradition” to “450 B.C., the supposed date of publication of the Twelve Tables in Rome”).
181 See Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383. In Owusu, the European Court of Justice
determined that Article 2 of the Brussels Convention precludes England, a common law country, from
“declining jurisdiction” pursuant to FNC. Id. at I-1459 to -1460. Article 2’s grant of jurisdiction is
“mandatory in nature”; an English court’s discretionary power to dismiss for FNC would undermine “the
principle of legal certainty” sought by the Brussels convention. Id. However, this holding does not speak to
the ability of a European court to hear a case dismissed by another court for FNC.
182 See, e.g., King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 562 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 2009) (FNC dismissal to Italy);
Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1993) (Germany); In re Air Crash at Madrid,
Spain, on August 20, 2008, 2011 WL 1058452 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011) (Spain). In none of these cases did
the court consider—or the plaintiffs suggest—that the particular European country would not hear the case
following an FNC dismissal, or was otherwise unavailable for its subsequent resolution.
183 See E-mail from Peter Hay, Prof., Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (May 29, 2011, 11:24 CET).
184 In addition to Ecuador, discussed here, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court declared certain bond
provisions imposed by its blocking statute unconstitutional. Dahl, supra note 103, at 23 & n.12.
185 Id. at app. at 48.
186 Id. at 23; see also Jaime Arosemena & Hernán Pérez Loose, The Unconstitutionality of Law 55 and the
Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, INT’L L. OFFICE (July 30, 2002), http://www.internationallawoffice.com/
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imagine a statute that is simultaneously unconstitutional and identical to
traditional civil law principles. Instead, the statute’s unconstitutionality must
lie in its departure from these principles, further calling into question the
position that Latin American blocking statutes merely reiterate foundational
principles of the civil law tradition.
2. Implications of the Reinterpretations Embodied in the Blocking Statutes
Latin America’s modern understanding of its own jurisdiction, whether
based on its national codes or more recent blocking statutes, reflects at least an
evolution from, rather than reincarnation of, basic civil law principles. While
this distinction may seem largely immaterial, it helps to explain the resistance
of many U.S. courts to the outcome seemingly mandated by this legislation—
that is, denial of an FNC dismissal to Latin America.187 Rather than an
inevitable consequence of two fundamentally different conceptions of
jurisdiction, this outcome appears a strategic attempt to force jurisdiction onto
the United States.188 Posited as the former, a court’s decision to grant an FNC
dismissal despite a blocking statute appears to be an offensive affront, or an
intolerant attempt to force its common law jurisprudence on Latin America;
viewed as the latter, however, this decision becomes a primarily defensive
maneuver intended to protect the courts’ legitimate interests, embodied by the
FNC doctrine.
Further, regardless of whether concepts of preemptive jurisdiction
otherwise dictate this result, Latin American legislatures enacted the blocking
statutes with the express purpose of frustrating U.S. courts’ attempts to dismiss
for FNC.189 At least arguably, this alone justifies the courts’ opposition: the
statutes seem to permit foreign plaintiffs, sanctioned by their national
governments, to take advantage of the U.S. judicial system without regard to
the burden placed on its courts or taxpayers. More problematic, the Latin
American plaintiffs unilaterally hold the power to render their national courts

newsletters/detail.aspx?g=dcf7e15e-f706-407a-aea0-0b3810468427 (“The rush to enact Law 55 caused both
formal and hierarchical violations to the Ecuadorian Constitution.”).
187 See supra Part II.A.
188 Again, Latin America is allowed to interpret its own law however it wishes; FNC may equally be
viewed as a strategic attempt to force litigation on another country. However, understanding that the outcome
dictated by blocking statutes is due the legislatures’ interpretation of civil law principles, rather than those
principles themselves, better explains U.S. courts’ behavior and allows for a solution that accommodates their
interests.
189 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
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unavailable. Filing first in Latin America, they may assuredly litigate there;190
filing first in the United States, the plaintiffs know that a court cannot
dismiss.191 Should the U.S. court conditionally dismiss anyway, the plaintiffs
can file in Latin America and then argue against that court’s jurisdiction, thus
guaranteeing that the Latin American court finds the refiling involuntary and
denies jurisdiction on that account.192 The plaintiffs can subsequently return to
the United States, having satisfied the conditions for refiling.193
In combination, the perceived reasons why Latin American countries
enacted these statutes and their implications for U.S. courts have led some U.S.
courts to manipulate their FNC analyses to more satisfying (and self-serving)
ends. As long as these courts perceive the statutes to encourage abuse of their
system, however accurately, they will likely persist in misapplying FNC to
achieve an outcome that feels fairer. As a result, U.S. courts will continue to
dismiss the claims of Latin American plaintiffs to courts unable or unwilling to
entertain them.
III. POTENTIAL AND IDEAL U.S. RESPONSES TO LATIN AMERICAN PREEMPTIVE
LEGISLATION
Recognizing the legitimacy of the U.S. courts’ concerns is important in
determining whether, and how, to respond to this situation.
Those
commentators that suggest courts must simply accept this litigation ensure the
plaintiff’s access to a court only by disregarding entirely that court’s interests.
Further, they fail to appreciate the improbability of a court’s adherence to a
proposal that is so against its self-interest. Instead, some courts will continue

190

Assuming that the plaintiff’s injury occurred in his home country. See supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
191 This statement assumes that U.S. courts are staying true to the FNC doctrine, which, as discussed, is
not always the case. See supra Part II.A.
192 See supra text accompanying notes 21–23.
193 Recognizing this, the Florida Court of Appeals requires that a plaintiff make a good-faith effort to
carry out the FNC dismissal order in Latin America. See Scotts Co. v. Hacienda Loma Linda, 2 So. 3d 1013,
1015–17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). In Scotts Co., the Florida court conditioned its FNC dismissal on the
plaintiff’s ability to refile in Panana. When it refiled, the plaintiff emphasized to the Panamanian court that the
United States had previously dismissed the case for FNC, and failed to submit to jurisdiction in Panama or to
request that Panama’s blocking statute not apply. On “appeal,” the plaintiff then asked for affirmation of the
lower court’s ruling. When the case returned to Florida, the court refused to proceed based on the plaintiff’s
attempt to manipulate its jurisdiction. 1 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 6:15 (2d ed. 2010).
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to misapply the FNC doctrine, which will neither lessen initial filings in the
United States194 nor guarantee plaintiffs a court in which to litigate.
For this reason, the United States should respond in some way.195 The
United States can assume one of two theoretically distinct approaches,196 either
(1) further manipulating the FNC doctrine to permit dismissal of cases brought
by Latin American plaintiffs despite their nations’ blocking statutes, or (2)
targeting the underlying source of the conflict—the allure of U.S. courts to
foreign litigants with cases more appropriately heard by the courts of their
home countries.197 The following section explores the practicability of each
option, as well as their advantages and disadvantages. Ultimately, this
Comment dismisses the first option because it prioritizes the courts’ interests
over those of the plaintiffs. This Comment concludes that the second option
most effectively reconciles a court’s efficiency and forum-shopping concerns
with a plaintiff’s right to litigate his case.

194 This is because, as long as U.S. courts treat FNC motions to Latin America inconsistently, there is
sufficient incentive for Latin American plaintiffs to continue filing in the United States for its numerous
benefits. See supra Part I.C.
195 More than one commentator has argued that international measures are most appropriate for this
conflict. See Daschbach, supra note 116, at 61–65 (discussing the development of a new multilateral treaty,
the expansion of an existing treaty, and the establishment of an international tribunal as potentially viable
means to address this problem); Figueroa, Conflicts of Jurisdiction, supra note 40, at 124 (concluding that
bilateral treaties between the United States and Latin American countries are “the natural way out of the FNC
impasse” and would have numerous positive effects); Figueroa, FNC Impasse, supra note 40, at 46 (“The best
mechanism for solving the FNC impasse would be an international treaty between the United States and most
Latin American countries.”).
196 Theoretically, a third approach would be for U.S. courts to narrow their concept of personal
jurisdiction so as to avoid triggering Latin American blocking statutes in the first place. Because Latin
America’s system of preemptive jurisdiction treats a plaintiff’s initial choice of forum as conclusive only if the
plaintiff filed in a court competent to hear the case according to both legal systems, see supra note 116, a
plaintiff’s initial filing in a U.S. court without proper jurisdiction would not extinguish the jurisdiction of its
home court. However, as the majority of these cases involve transnational tort claims against U.S.
corporations, typically at least one U.S. court will have proper jurisdiction over the defendant. In order to find
lack of personal jurisdiction over the Latin American plaintiff, then, a U.S. court would have to consider the
plaintiff’s submission alone to be insufficient for this purpose. So holding would seriously change basic
principles upon which the United States’ current conception of jurisdiction rests. Further, this interpretation
would likely raise constitutional issues based on the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee to all “persons”—as
opposed to “citizens”—equal protection and due process. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. Manipulating
jurisdiction in this way would therefore have consequences far greater than the problem it seeks to solve.
197 See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1163 (“[T]he assumption . . . is that a court in the United States will apply
domestic law in a transnational tort case.” (footnote omitted)).
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A. Further Manipulation of FNC to Permit Dismissals Despite Latin
American Blocking Statutes
As discussed above, a correct interpretation of the current FNC doctrine
requires that a U.S. court refuse to dismiss a case under FNC when (1) the case
is brought by a Latin American plaintiff, (2) the potential alternative forum is
that plaintiff’s home country, and (3) that country has a blocking statute
terminating the jurisdiction of its courts over cases dismissed abroad under
FNC. While some courts have correctly applied the doctrine and accepted
jurisdiction over these cases, a number of courts have instead determined that
an alternative forum exists, despite persuasive evidence to the contrary, and
dismissed accordingly. The inconsistent outcomes are problematic because
they neither lessen initial filings in the United States nor guarantee the plaintiff
a forum in which to bring his claim.198
In order to avoid straining the existing doctrine, ensure consistency, and
prevent forum shopping, U.S. courts may choose to reconsider the definition of
an adequate alternative forum or its role in FNC analysis. For instance, in a
different context, more than one court has held that, rather than a “precondition
to dismissal,” “the availability of another suitable forum is a most important
factor” in granting FNC dismissal.199 If an adequate alternative forum were a
balancing factor rather than a prerequisite inquiry, its absence would not
preclude a court from continuing to the second prong of FNC analysis.200
Instead, such availability—or lack thereof—would be considered in
combination with the other public and private factors of Gilbert.201
To the same end, courts could redefine adequate alternative forum to
denote a jurisdiction that would have been available had the plaintiffs filed
198

See supra Part I.B.3 (noting the continued appeal of U.S. courts so long as U.S. law remains an

option).
199 Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 467 N.E.2d 245, 248–50 (N.Y. 1984) (tracing the origins of this
“perceived requirement” to dicta in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)); see also Shin-Etsu Chem.
Co. v. 3033 ICICI Bank Ltd., 777 N.Y.S.2d 69, 75 (App. Div. 2004) (construing the availability of an
alternative forum as “an important consideration” but not a “precondition to dismissal”); Moenzina v.
Moenzina, 507 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (App. Div. 1986); Broukhim v. Hay, 504 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468 (App. Div.
1986). But see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) (characterizing the availability of
an alternative forum as an “initial requirement” to FNC dismissal); Paulownia Plantations de Pan. Corp. v.
Rajamannan, 757 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] determination of the availability and
adequacy of the alternative forum is implicit in the Hague decision.”). While this is “very much a minority
approach today,” it stands to become more popular if additional countries enact blocking statutes. Heiser,
supra note 41, at 658–59.
200 See supra Part I.B.1.
201 Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1641.
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there initially, or one that “could have jurisdiction if its legislators so
decided.”202 In doing so, FNC dismissal would remain inappropriate when the
alternative forum was either inadequate or unavailable from the beginning—
for instance, due to rampant corruption in the national courts or nonrecognition
of the plaintiff’s cause of action.203 However, where a court’s jurisdiction was
extinguished solely as a result of the foreign plaintiffs’ strategic choice to file
first in the United States, a U.S. court could correctly assert that the foreign
court remains an adequate alternative. In effect, both approaches manipulate
the FNC doctrine to “block” the blocking statutes.
This approach adequately responds to the courts’ forum shopping concerns,
discussed in Parts I.A.3 and II.B, which underlie their inconsistent treatment.
In particular, finding a court adequate despite a blocking statute effectively
eliminates the potential for foreign plaintiffs to forum shop in the United States
and the ability of Latin American legislation to facilitate this forum shopping.
If U.S. courts dismissed for FNC without attention to the presence of blocking
statutes or their effects, Latin American plaintiffs would have no incentive to
file here in the first place. The plaintiffs could file initially in their home
courts, which would have proper jurisdiction over their claims.
To the extent our primary concern, then, is U.S. courts’ misapplication of
FNC as a response to Latin American preemptive legislation, either approach
is a satisfactory response. However, Latin American courts do not care
whether U.S. courts have rightly dismissed a case under their own FNC
doctrine, nor do they care whether the U.S. court considers its dismissal to
meet the standards of that Latin American court.204 Thus, correct application
of this reworked FNC doctrine precipitates the same problematic outcome as
incorrect application of the existing doctrine: a foreign plaintiff, his case
dismissed abroad under FNC, has no other forum in which to litigate. A
necessary corollary, the tortious conduct of U.S. defendants abroad becomes,
in essence, immune from suit.
Perhaps one could argue that insistent denial of Latin American plaintiffs’
access to U.S. courts through FNC, regardless of another forum’s availability,
may pressure Latin American countries to abandon these blocking statutes to

202

Gordon, supra note 123, at 155–56.
See supra Part I.B.1.
204 See Muttreja, supra note 63, at 1630 (suggesting that “[a] U.S. court’s independent interpretation of
foreign rules . . . is much less appropriate when it runs contrary to foreign authority,” particularly because the
purpose of “the FNC availability inquiry is to predict what a foreign court . . . will do”).
203
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ensure their citizens some form of justice. However, if these countries truly
view this legislation as based on constitutional principles or otherwise inherent
in their civil codes, this outcome is highly unlikely. Further, even if FNC
dismissals could provoke this sort of change within Latin American countries,
this approach treats the first generation of dismissed plaintiffs, whose claims
will subsequently go unheard, as necessary casualties to the doctrinal conflict
between the United States and Latin America.
Most importantly, an FNC dismissal is not a “judicial right”205 but depends
This requirement is not
on the availability of another forum.206
inconsequential; rather, it reflects a policy consideration of foremost
importance.207 To disregard this analysis, in either application208 or effect,209 is
to seriously deviate from the doctrine imagined in Gilbert and Piper.
Requiring a U.S. court to unreservedly accept this litigation overlooks the
interests of that court in favor of the plaintiff’s right to a forum; however,
permitting a court to dismiss this litigation without finding that another court
exists improperly sacrifices the plaintiff’s interest to appease the court’s
concerns. An ideal solution, then, will consider each participant’s interest and
seek to accommodate both.
B. Choice-of-Law Legislation to Target the Source of the Problem
Choice-of-law legislation is this solution. As discussed in Part I.C above,
foreign litigants are attracted to U.S. courts for a number of procedural,
systemic, and substantive reasons. The foremost enticement is the potential for
a U.S. court to apply domestic law to the dispute.210 As most of these cases
involve transnational tort claims, the outcome of the case, both in terms of
liability and damages, depends largely on what law is applied. Thus, even
though application of U.S. law is not assured, its possibility creates sufficient
incentive for foreign plaintiffs to forgo the convenience of litigating at
home.211

205

Id. at 1626.
See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
207 The importance of this consideration is underscored, rather than tempered, by the fact that the Court
took for granted the existence of an alternative forum in the two seminal cases on FNC.
208 That is, by interpreting availability as a nondispositive factor for FNC dismissal. See supra text
accompanying notes 199–201.
209 That is, by construing as available a forum that, according to its own law, will not hear the case.
210 See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1163.
211 See id.
206
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The expectations of these plaintiffs are often met. According to one study,
the “modern conflicts systems tend to favor the application of forum law.”212
Thus, most courts in the United States that adhere to modern choice-of-law
principles will apply their own substantive law, regardless of the plaintiffs’
nationality or the place of injury.213 Other courts following the traditional
choice-of-law approach will likely apply foreign law to the same dispute.214
Inconsistent application of substantive law to these transnational tort claims
fuels their continued filing in the United States. Further, internal judicial
resolution is unlikely because choice of law is fact specific and its application
is thus discretionary.
Against this backdrop, legislation mandating application of foreign law
most effectively reconciles the interests of the courts and plaintiffs by ensuring
the plaintiffs a U.S. forum in which to litigate but lessening their incentive to
do so. This Comment first establishes the suitability of such choice-of-law
legislation in view of both constitutional imperatives and courts’ doctrinal
preferences. Next, this Comment explores how this course of action better
balances the competing concerns that other potential solutions fail to
reconcile—namely, the legitimate resistance of courts to forum shopping and
the rights of plaintiffs to a forum.
1. Appropriateness of Application of Foreign Law
The Supreme Court explicated the constitutional standard for choice-of-law
determinations in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague: “[A] choice-of-law decision
would violate the Due Process Clause if it were totally arbitrary or if it were
fundamentally unfair to either litigant.”215 The Court went on to recognize that
application of the law of any state having “significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests” likely meets this low
threshold.216 Because FNC dismissals similarly require a finding of significant
contacts with the foreign forum—in fact, contacts more significant than those
with the United States—mandatory application of foreign law to the narrow

212 Id. at 1163 n.9 (citing Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 377–78 (1992)). Modern choice-of-law rules are reflected in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
213 See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1163–64.
214 See infra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
215 449 U.S. 302, 326 (1981).
216 See id. at 313.
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class of cases discussed above necessarily comports with the Court’s
articulation of due process.
In fact, traditional choice-of-law doctrine would likely advocate for
application of foreign law. For tort cases, courts still following this approach,
embodied by the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, will usually apply
“[t]he law of the place of wrong,” or the place “where the last event necessary
to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.”217 In most situations,
this is the place of the plaintiff’s injury.218 Latin American law would thus
apply to any claim brought by a Latin American plaintiff against a U.S.
defendant for an injury sustained in the plaintiff’s home country. The
plaintiff’s selection of forum thus becomes irrelevant for choice-of-law
purposes. Theoretically, then, a Latin American plaintiff has significantly less
incentive to file in a U.S. court following the traditional approach to choice of
law.219
On the other hand, modern choice-of-law doctrine often favors application
of forum law.220 However, it also recognizes that statutory directives, whether
expressly or indirectly legislated, will trump traditional choice-of-law
principles.221 This widely accepted concept recognizes that a legislature may
view choice-of-law legislation as a means by which to achieve specific policy
objectives, and this legislative decision deserves deference. Thus, even were
application of domestic law preferable according to modern choice-of-law
rules, a legislature could still require application of foreign law for any number
of policy reasons.
Further, application of foreign law to those cases eligible for FNC
dismissal is not inconsistent with modern choice-of-law doctrine. The
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws advocates only for a more casespecific approach to choice-of-law determinations. Accordingly, section 6

217

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377–78 (1934).
The common conception is that there is no tort absent an injury to someone or something.
219 See supra notes 100, 197.
220 See Joseph William Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV. 731, 743 (1990) (“Judges
do have a strong tendency to apply forum law when they can.”).
221 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971) (“A court, subject to constitutional
restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.”); id. § 6 cmt. b ( “[T]he court
[should] apply a local statute in the manner intended by the legislature even when the local law of another state
would be applicable under usual choice-of-law principles.”).
218
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points to a list of factors relevant to any choice-of-law decision,222 including
“the relevant policies of the forum”223 and “the relevant policies of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of
the particular issue.”224 Arguably, a Latin American forum has some interest
in the regulation of a foreign corporation within its borders, deterrence of the
corporation’s tortious conduct, and compensation of its injured citizens.225 Of
equal import, a U.S. court has a strong interest in preventing foreign plaintiffs
from exploiting the U.S. legal system for its numerous advantages. To the
extent that application of foreign law would lessen this exploitation in
situations where FNC could not, policy reasons actually favor such application.
For tort claims in particular, section 145 of the Restatement (Second)
identifies the applicable law as that of the state having “the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in
§ 6.”226 Relevant considerations include “(a) the place where the injury
occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the
domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.”227 Where a plaintiff sustains an injury in his state of citizenship
or residency due to the defendant’s conduct within that state,228 as in most tort
cases brought by Latin American plaintiffs in the United States, there is a
strong argument that this state’s relationship to the occurrence and the parties

222 Section 6 is the “cornerstone” of the Restatement, outlining the policies and values that should underlie
every choice-of-law decision. PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 63 (5th ed. 2010).
223 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b) (1971).
224 Id. § 6(2)(c). Another relevant factor is “ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied,” which clearly favors application of domestic law. Id. § 6(2)(g). See infra text accompanying note
236.
225 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 cmt. b (1971) (suggesting that the relative
interests of each forum are even more important to choice-of-law determinations in tort cases due to the
relative insignificance of other factors listed in section 6). This is not to say that the United States has no
interest in similarly regulating the international conduct of its corporations.
226 Id. § 145(1).
227 Id. § 145(2). However, “[i]t is not sufficient merely to tally the § 145 contacts and choose the state
with the greatest number. The resolution of choice of law questions turns on the qualitative nature of those
contacts as affected by the policy factors enumerated in § 6.” Herrera v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., No. B-07-114,
2009 WL 700645, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2009) (citations omitted).
228 The same argument may be made even where defendant’s conduct may be characterized as having
occurred outside the state of injury.
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is most significant.229 In this situation, application of foreign law is justified, if
not proper.
However proper, U.S. courts will not consistently and uniformly apply
foreign law to these disputes absent legislation mandating the same. Various
courts employ diverse approaches to choice of law, resulting in notoriously
unpredictable and inconsistent outcomes.230 In addition, they are particularly
“unlikely to both apply foreign law and deny a forum non conveniens
motion,”231 reinforcing the need for a statutory directive to ensure that—when
faced with a case that would be dismissed to Latin America but for a blocking
statute—U.S. courts apply foreign law.
2. Desirability of Application of Foreign Law
Application of forum law to transnational tort disputes may be appropriate
when courts can use FNC to dismiss those cases with unacceptably tenuous
relationships to the forum; absent this ability, however, its application merely
invites litigation that courts are then powerless to dismiss. Further, courts
grant FNC motions only when the alternative forum, at least according to the
dismissing court, has the most significant relationship to the plaintiff’s claim.
Thus, in the limited instances where Latin American preemptive legislation
undermines a court’s ability to dismiss for FNC, application of foreign law—
the law of the forum having the most significant relationship to the claim, and
the law that would have been applied had the plaintiff refiled in his home
country following an FNC dismissal—is a reasonable, strategic choice.
Foremost, application of foreign law is an ideal strategy because it
simultaneously values the interest of the court and the interest of the plaintiff,
thus avoiding the major pitfalls presented by the other potential courses of
action. While this legislation will discourage foreign plaintiffs from filing in
the United States,232 it will not deny them this right.233 Further, as this
legislation mandates consistency, foreign plaintiffs have a well-defined choice

229 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971); see, e.g., Tazoe v. Aereas, No. 0721941-CIV, 2009 WL 3232908 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2009).
230 Symeon C. Symeonides, Oregon’s New Choice-of-Law Codification for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis,
88 OR. L. REV. 963, 969 (2009). (“The excessive fluidity of the various judicial choice-of-law approaches
often makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to predict the outcome of a choice-of-law decision.”).
231 See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1165.
232 In contrast to forcing courts to unconditionally accept these cases. See supra note 194.
233 In contrast to manipulating the FNC doctrine to permit dismissals regardless of an alternative forum.
See supra Part III.A.
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that should yield a predictable outcome: file first in Latin America and enjoy
the convenience of litigating at home, or file first in the United States with the
guaranteed application of Latin American tort law, including its damage
calculations. In many situations, the inconvenience of participating in ongoing
litigation abroad will outweigh the benefits of litigation in the United States
once the enticement of U.S. law is removed.234
Equally important, the ability of this approach to preserve a forum for the
plaintiffs but to make this forum less desirable acts to limit the impact of
blocking statutes in a nonconfrontational manner. Currently the courts that
view these statutes as willful attempts by Latin American legislatures to force
jurisdiction on the United States manipulate FNC to dismiss regardless.
Whether this perception is correct, these decisions appear to disrespect the
plaintiffs’ home countries and their preemptive systems of jurisdiction.
Choice-of-law legislation thus prevents, to the extent possible, the actions of
U.S. courts from having undesirable effects in Latin America, which spurred
the blocking statutes initially,235 while still allowing these courts to protect
their own interests.
Admittedly, mandatory application of foreign law denies U.S. courts the
usual discretion afforded in choice-of-law decisions.236 Further, although
courts will avoid complicated choice-of-law analysis, this legislation forces
courts to apply perhaps unfamiliar law, which they are notably hesitant to
do.237 However, the legislation’s narrow scope and concurrent benefits make
its application worthwhile despite these downsides.
CONCLUSION
Many courts have accepted jurisdiction over cases appropriate for forum
non conveniens dismissal due to Latin American blocking statutes that render
the alternative forums unavailable. This result is doctrinally correct, but
234 Still, there are numerous procedural and systemic reasons why foreign plaintiffs may still choose to
file in the United States. See Heiser, supra note 61, at 1182 (suggesting that foreign plaintiffs would still
desire to litigate in the United States if courts applied foreign law to their disputes); supra Part I.C. Intuitively,
if these plaintiffs are filing for a reason other than U.S. law—e.g., serious procedural deficiencies in their
home courts that make vindication unlikely—U.S. courts arguably should be less hesitant to accept these
cases. However, this position is seriously weakened by the courts’ evaluation of “adequacy,” which largely
disregards considerations such as chronic delay and backlog, or problems with enforcement. See supra Part
I.B.
235 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
236 See supra note 224.
237 See supra text accompanying notes 220, 231.
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incentivizes foreign plaintiffs to continue filing these claims in the United
States and empowers them to unilaterally strip their home courts of
jurisdiction, further obliging U.S. courts to entertain these disputes.
Meanwhile, persistent dismissals by other U.S. courts reflect incorrect
availability analyses, likely prompted by forum shopping concerns and
exacerbated by the perception of blocking statutes as strategic attempts to
sterilize the FNC doctrine. These concerns are valid, but this outcome
improperly assigns them greater weight than the foreign plaintiffs’ right to a
forum. Consequently, the plaintiffs’ legitimate harms go without redress.
While correct application of FNC is important, any doctrinal manipulation
aiming solely to reconcile the doctrine with its application by U.S. courts is
unfaithful to the spirit of FNC unless it also ensures the plaintiffs a forum in
which to litigate. Yet some courts will likely misapply any construct of FNC
so long as they perceive its application to yield an unfair result. An ideal
solution will ignore neither the court’s nor the plaintiff’s concerns, instead
targeting the underlying source of the problem by removing the foremost
incentive for plaintiffs to file in the United States. Choice-of-law legislation
best reconciles a court’s legitimate concerns with a plaintiff’s interests in
having a court in which to present his case. By proceeding in this manner,
U.S. courts can diplomatically protect their own interests, neither denying
foreign plaintiffs a forum nor dismissing for FNC to Latin American countries
that perceive the consequences of such dismissals to violate their civil law
principles of jurisdiction.
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